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Hilary J. Allen1
Financial innovation introduces new and complex products into the
financial system, providing market participants with more bespoke ways to
manage their risk, return and liquidity. However, by increasing the
complexity of the financial system, financial innovation also compromises
financial stability. Faced with the rapid pace of financial innovation,
regulators have two options. One is to seek to meet the complexity of the
industry with complex regulation, in an arms race that under-resourced
regulators are bound to lose. The less explored (and more controversial)
path is for regulators to try to reduce the complexity of the financial system
by limiting financial innovation through a pre-approval process for new
financial products. This Essay surveys and adds to the proposals that have
been advanced for such precautionary pre-approval of new financial
products, focusing on the political and technical challenges that such
proposals face.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many who argue that if sophisticated institutional investors
want to risk their money on complex financial products, then they should be
allowed to do so, and the law should not interfere.2 However, this
1

Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. This Essay reflects numerous
conversations regarding financial product pre-approval regimes, particularly those
conducted at the Mandatory Approval of Financial Instruments International Workshop in
Brussels, Belgium sponsored by the World Future Council and the EU Office of the
Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung; the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research Conference
in Squaw Valley, California; and the Sydney Law School/Australian Securities and
Investments Commission Seminar on Regulating Complex Financial Products in Sydney,
Australia. Thanks go to the organizers of, and participants in, each of those events –
especially Professor Saule Omarova and ASIC Commissioner Greg Tanzer, who provided
helpful comments on this Essay.
2
Such belief perhaps reached its zenith with the enactment of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)), which “expressly
removed credit default swaps from the direct authority of relevant financial markets
regulatory agencies.” Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default
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perspective ignores the experience of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (the
“Financial Crisis”), which vividly illustrated the externalities that complex
financial products can create.3 Such externalities, rather than the welfare of
the counterparties themselves, are the primary focus of financial stability
regulation.4 This Essay focuses in particular on the risks to financial
stability posed by the increasing complexity of the financial system, and on
the proposals that have been made to mitigate such risks with a pre-approval
regime for financial products.
The introduction of new financial products exacerbates the
complexity of what is already a hugely complex financial system. As
Section II of this Essay explores, complexity poses a real threat to financial
stability. Such complexity increases the number of feedback loops that
speed the transmission of shocks through the financial system, and it also
makes the financial system and the linkages between institutions therein
opaque to regulators and to market participants. Currently, disclosure
regulation is the favored method of addressing new financial products, but
such regulation is limited in its ability to address the problems posed by
complexity. Instead, complexity is best dealt with by precautionary
regulation that aims to simplify the financial system – by limiting the new
products that enter into that system. The concept of precaution is elaborated
upon in Section III. In recent years, there have been two proposals
advanced for pre-approval of financial products that focus on limiting
complexity, rather than on consumer protection. These are briefly explored
in Section IV. The first, advanced by Posner & Weyl, seeks to limit
products that are purely speculative in nature – but it is not concerned with
the systemic risks created by financial products.5 The second, advanced by
Omarova, is more concerned with such systemic risks – this proposal is a
better fit with this Essay’s concerns regarding financial stability.6
Section V of this Essay considers the political and technical
impediments to implementing precautionary review for new financial
products. Political willingness to implement such a regime is likely to
reflect prevailing attitudes to similarly precautionary regimes, like
environmental regulation. At present, the European Union seems the more
Swap Commons, 82 COLO. L. REV. 167, 221 (2011). Although this ideology was shaken
somewhat by the Financial Crisis, “the belief that lightly regulated financial markets are
good for the economy…was dogma from the 1990s until 2008 and has survived the
financial crisis surprisingly intact”. James Kwak, Incentives and Ideology, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F. 253, 257 (2014).
3
For a discussion of the social costs that can result from financial system failure, see Hilary
J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76
Ohio St. L. J. __, __ (2015).
4
Id. at __.
5
Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable
Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307 (2013).
6
Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 64 (2012).
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likely candidate to implement such a regime, whereas the United States
seems less amenable.7 However, transatlantic regulatory coordination is
likely to be a prerequisite for an effective pre-approval regime (the outcome
of negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that
are currently being undertaken by the United States and Europe may
therefore have some bearing on the feasibility of the proposals in this
Essay). With regard to technical issues, the greatest impediment to a
product pre-approval process is the lack of any existing taxonomy of
financial products that could be used to determine whether a product is
“new” and thus requires approval. Section V.B therefore uses insights from
biology to suggest how such a catalogue of financial products could be
structured. Even if there is insufficient political will to implement a preapproval regime, such a catalogue could be enormously helpful in the
monitoring of systemic risks in the financial system.
II. THE PROBLEM OF COMPLEXITY
Complexity limits the ability of regulators and market participants to
understand financial products, and to understand how such products link
different financial institutions to each other.8 As such, the opacity created
by complexity is generally recognized as posing a challenge both to
financial stability regulation and to market discipline.9 However, it is
perhaps underappreciated that complexity is in and of itself a destabilizing
force – this Section will briefly unpack the threats that complexity poses to
the financial system.
The more complex financial products that are introduced into the
financial system, the more linkages there are between financial institutions.
For example, when a financial institution enters into a complex financial
contract like a credit default swap, a linkage is created not only between the
counterparties to the credit default swap contract, but also between each of
those counterparties and the issuer of the underlying debt contract that is
referenced by the swap:10 “[c]ross-system complexity has exploded over
recent decades due to the growth in opaque, intra-financial system chains of
7

Conventional wisdom is that Europe is much more amenable to precautionary regulation
than the United States. In 2003, the head of the United States’ OIRA described the
precautionary principle as “a mythical concept, perhaps like a unicorn.” Noga MoragLevine, The History of Precaution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L 1095, 1096 (2014).
8
“[C]omplexity renders the system increasingly opaque to reasoned human cognition,
making it more difficult to make thoughtful judgments about where risk lies.” Hilary J.
Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 861, 872 (2015).
9
David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. __,
__ (2015).
10
Products like these “increase[] dramatically the number of possible configurations of
contracts and the possible outcomes”. Stefano Battiston, Guido Caldarelli, Robert M. May,
Tarik Roukny and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Complexity in Financial Networks, 18
(Apr. 20, 2015) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2594028).
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exposure”.11 Furthermore, when an underlying contract becomes the
reference asset for a swap (or is bundled together with other contracts in an
asset securitization), it becomes harder to modify that underlying contract.12
The contracts that underlie complex financial products therefore become
more rigid, and on a large scale, increased rigidity can render the financial
system less able to absorb shocks.13
Linkages between institutions can also function as feedback loops,
speeding up and amplifying the transmission of shocks throughout the
financial system.14 As Schwarcz has illustrated by analogy to complex
engineering systems, “in a complex system, signals are sometimes
inadvertently transmitted too quickly to control.”15 Given the speed with
which shocks can be transmitted through a financial system filled with such
interconnections, both market participants and regulators will be forced to
react very quickly if such a shock does occur.16 When they lack time to
make an informed decision about the value of a product, market participants
and regulators are forced to rely on shortcuts like rules-of-thumb and
computer programs.17 The opacity created by complexity encourages
reliance on these same shortcuts, which tend to respond to low-probability
(but potentially high-impact) shocks in similar ways.18 Broad-based
11

Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Member, Fin. Policy Comm. & Vasileios
Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s
36th Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee, 18 (Aug. 31, 2012) (available
at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2012/ah.pdf).
12
Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 709 (2012)
13

Pistor has written about the importance of including “safety valves” in financial
contracts to allow such contracts to adapt to crisis circumstances. Katharina Pistor,
A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECONOMICS 315, 329 (2013).

14

Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 211, 215 (2009). Such amplification is particularly likely to occur when there is a
long chain of institutions involved in the creation and sale of a product, such as often occurs
in securitization transactions. As Shin established, each link in the securitization chain
must use increasingly cheaper funding to make the transaction viable, and funding
generally becomes cheaper when it is short-term (because of the lowered – but not
eliminated – chance that something can go wrong in the brief period of exposure). Hyun
Song Shin, Macroprudential Policies Beyond Basel III, 8 (Nov. 22, 2010) (available at
https://www.princeton.edu/~hsshin/www/MacroprudentialMemo.pdf). Chains of
institutions involved in the generation of a complex financial product thus entail increased
reliance on short-term funding – but such reliance is problematic in that the continued
availability of short-term funding is subject to runs.
15
Schwarcz, supra Note 14 at 215.
16
Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV.
779, 802 (2011).
17
Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 173, 218 (2013).
18
See Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, in
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY SYMPOSIUM: THE GREENSPAN
ERA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 313, 343 (2005); Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
& Robert Vishny, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility, in FONDAZIONE ENI
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reliance on the same shortcuts is therefore likely to correlate the behavior of
actors in the financial system in the event of a crisis – the more complex the
system, the more likely we are to see the panicked herd behavior
(particularly destructive fire sales of financial assets) that precipitates
financial instability.19
Complexity also exacerbates the “too big to fail” problem.20
Increased interconnection increases the likelihood that one institution’s
failure will impact the liquidity and solvency of another institution, but it
hinders the ability of regulators to follow the pathways of contagion and
determine the exact consequences of such failure.21 A lack of clarity about
the exposures of a large, interconnected financial institution therefore makes
it much more likely that it will be bailed-out in a time of panic, incentivizing
such institution to take larger risks than it might otherwise take in the
absence of an implied government safety net.22 It may be rational, then, for
large financial institutions to purposely generate more complexity in the
financial system, in order to entrench their status as “too big to fail”.
Financial industry participants may also aggressively structure the financial
products they issue to be as complex as possible, so as to insulate those
products from scrutiny (both from regulators and market participants).
Although Hu has recommended that some of these issues could be addressed
by “disintermediating” the provision of information to regulators and market
participants,23 market participants in particular are limited in their ability
and willingness to review voluminous and complex information at the best
of times,24 let alone during a full-blown panic. Disclosure regimes are
therefore limited in their ability to address the opacity created by
complexity.25
Disclosure-based approaches to dealing with new products are also
limited in other ways. Such approaches do nothing to slow down the
increasingly speedy transmission of shocks facilitated by the everaccelerating number of linkages in the financial system, or to address the
rigidity introduced into the system by complex financial products. They do
nothing to limit the development of products that introduce new and
unregulated types of leverage into the system, making the system as a whole

ENRICO MATTEI NOTA DI Lavoro, No. 114.2010, 4 (May, 2010), available at
http://www.feem.it/ userfiles/attach/20109211528484NDL2010-114.pdf.
19
Allen, supra Note 17 at 219.
20
Battiston et al., supra Note 10 at 2.
21
Id. at 18.
22
Id. at 16.
23
Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information”, and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1601 (2012).
24
Min, supra Note 9 at __.
25
Judge, supra Note 12 at 712.
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more fragile and susceptible to shocks.26 Instead, disclosure regimes are
focused on the parties to the product: any externalities generated by the
product are at best secondary concerns. Thus, if we wish to promote
financial stability, something more than a disclosure regime is needed.
III. A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO COMPLEXITY
Once a complex financial product becomes established in the
marketplace, regulators are unlikely to ban such product, even if it becomes
problematic.27 Instead, if regulators implement substantive regulation to
address the failures of the product, they are more likely to do so
incrementally as the flaws become apparent, adding regulatory complexity
to an already complex product.28 Attempting to meet the complexity of the
financial system with even more complex regulatory rules incentivizes
financial institutions to arbitrage those rules by creating more complex
products that operate in the interstices of the regulation.29 This vicious cycle
is clearly suboptimal. In their illuminating presentation “The Dog and the
Frisbee” Haldane and Madouros make the valuable point that “the more
complex the environment, the greater the perils of complex control. The
optimal response to a complex environment is often not a fully statecontingent rule. Rather, it is to simplify and streamline.”30 Thus, rather than
following the status quo approach to regulating complex financial products,
this Essay argues for rules that seek to simplify the financial system.
A precautionary pre-approval review of financial products would
occur prior to the introduction of such products into the system. If a product
did not meet the initial requirements for approval, it would be banned, thus
limiting the number of new products entering the financial system and
mitigating a further spiral into complexity. The following Sections will
explore the details of how such a pre-approval process would work but first,
by way of background, this Section will explain what is meant by a
precautionary approach to financial stability regulation. The form of the
precautionary principle I have previously advocated for is what Sunstein has
called the “stronger” form of the precautionary principle.31 Essentially, this
means that “where activities can pose great harm, precautionary regulation
should be employed that effectively shifts the burden of proof that the
26

See, for example, Geanakoplos’ discussion of how the innovation of the credit default
swap created a new and almost limitless source of leverage in the financial system. John
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, in D.Acemoglu, K. Rogoff, and M. Woodford, eds., 24
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, 1, 6 (2010).
27
Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1650 (2007-2008).
28
Allen, supra Note 17 at 186-187.
29
Id.
30
Haldane & Madouros, supra Note 11 at 4.
31
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global Warming, Terrorism, and Other
Problems, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006)
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activity should be permitted to the proponent of that activity, rather than the
regulator having to make the case for why regulation is necessary.”32 With
the stronger form of the precautionary principle, the burden that the
proponent of a new financial product must meet is not insurmountable –
regulators can still permit products that are likely to have some adverse
consequences. And regulators can still prohibit products that have
beneficial aspects, if they determine that – on balance – the negatives
outweigh the positives. Importantly, the stronger-form precautionary
principle does not permit regulators to ignore the costs of financial stability
regulation. Instead, it dictates that regulators should proceed from an
understanding that “maintaining a stable financial system is a benefit to
society of great magnitude and that the fiscal and monetary remedies
available after a crisis are costly, while acknowledging that neither of these
can be accurately reflected as a dollar amount. Nonetheless, these benefits
must be weighed against the costs of the regulation, both in terms of
immediate quantifiable short-term costs, and long-term unquantifiable costs
in the sense of foregone benefits.”33
A precautionary approach to evaluating complex financial products
recognizes that there is no exact formula that can decide whether a product
should be permitted or not34 – it rejects quantified cost-benefit analysis as a
standard for judging financial stability regulation.35 This admittedly
requires trusting regulatory experts in their evaluation of products, and these
experts are not immune from mistakes.36 The fear of such mistakes might
raise concerns about moral hazard:37 when a government authority approves
a product, the product may seem to carry an authoritative seal of approval
that disincentivizes users from investigating the product for themselves,
notwithstanding that the government authority may have erred in approving
it.38 However, the degree to which moral hazard is an issue depends on the
type of government approval granted. The regime proposed in this Essay is
not a consumer or investor protection regime. There is therefore no
implication that an approved product is suitable for any particular user –
only that the perceived systemic risks posed by the product do not outweigh
the contribution that the product is likely to make to economic growth.
32

Allen, supra Note 17 at 195.
Id. at 196.
34
Id. at 206; 212.
35
See Note 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of “quantified cost-benefit analysis”.
36
“Of course, simple rules are not costless. They place a heavy reliance on the judgement
of the decision-maker”. Haldane & Madouros, supra Note 11 at 6.
37
Moral hazard is the tendency of a guarantee, or something similar, to lessen a person’s
incentives to act prudently. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L.
Rev. 237, 239; 270 (1996).
38
In a similar vein, many raised concerns about investors being encouraged to rely too
heavily on credit ratings of financial products, if such credit ratings were given by credit
rating agencies that were part of an approved government panel. Securities and Exchange
Commission, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSIGNED RATINGS, 31-33 (Dec. 2012)
(available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/assigned-credit-ratings-study.pdf).
33
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Because market participants do not usually concern themselves with
systemic stability issues when they make their investment decisions,39 there
is little risk of this type of government approval influencing their decision
process. Indeed, financial stability regulation is required precisely because
the private sector lacks the incentives and resources to conduct business in a
way that is calculated to preserve financial stability.40
As such,
notwithstanding that regulators may make mistakes, the threats that financial
innovation pose to financial stability should not remain unaddressed by
regulation.41
IV. PRE-APPROVAL REGIMES FOR COMPLEX FINANCIAL PRODUCTS
“Innovation” is a term that has broadly positive connotations,42 but
not all financial innovation is beneficial. Many complex financial products
seem to have been generated by large financial institutions in order to
maximize profits on the supply side, or to arbitrage regulatory requirements,
rather than in response to any real investor demand or market need.43 In this
sense, much financial innovation can be conceived of as “sustaining
innovation”, being innovation that is “faster than [incumbents’] customers’
needs evolve, [so incumbents] eventually end up producing products or
services that are actually too sophisticated, too expensive, and too
complicated for many customers in the market.”44 Even products that seem
to respond to genuine market needs may be problematic: to satisfy demand
for higher return but seemingly lower-risk products, complex financial
products are often engineered to concentrate the risk in the tail – meaning
that the risk is low probability but high-consequence,45 and as a result often
underpriced.46 Such innovations “are in fact designed to concentrate risk
with investors who do not truly appreciate the risk that they are taking on”,47
rather than meeting the need they were purportedly created to serve.
Furthermore, as Turner has noted, at a certain point there must be
“diminishing marginal returns” to providing ever more bespoke ways to

39

Financial stability is a common good that is prone to free-riding, and so financial
institutions have little incentive to structure their dealings so as to maintain that stability for
the benefit of society as a whole (even though everyone ultimately benefits from financial
stability in the long run). Allen, supra Note 17 at 184.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 206.
42
Adair Turner, Lecture at CASS Business School: What Do Banks Do, What Should They
Do and What Public Policies Are Needed to Ensure Best Results for the Real Economy? 7
(Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/at_17mar10.pdf.
43
Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 262 (2012).
44
Clayton Christiensen, Disruptive Innovation (available at
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/)
45
Rajan, supra Note 18 at 316.
46
Gennaioli et al., supra Note 18 at 2.
47
Allen, supra Note 17 at 216-217.
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intermediate capital or manage risk.48 Given the threat that increasing
complexity poses to financial stability, it makes sense to implement a preapproval process for financial products that prevents innovations from being
sold if they make no more than marginal improvements to the efficient
functioning of the financial system.
Discussions of pre-approval regimes for financial products are often
likened to “an FDA for financial products”.49 Such analogies are not
entirely apt, however, because it is not really feasible to conduct clinical
trials of financial products in the same way that the FDA tests
pharmaceuticals.50 Instead, the most prominent proposals for pre-approval
of complex financial products are the models promulgated by Saule
Omarova, and by Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl,51 and both models require
judgment calls by the regulators involved. Posner & Weyl have proposed an
agency to review financial products, which agency would only approve a
product if deemed socially utile – otherwise, the product would be banned.52
Pursuant to Posner & Weyl’s model, determinations of utility would be
based primarily on the criterion of whether the innovation is intended for
socially useful “insuring” purposes, or for “gambling” purposes (with
innovations that primarily facilitate gambling deemed per se inutile).53
However, as Posner & Weyl readily concede, their model largely ignores
any systemic risks posed by the innovation:54 for example, their agency
would approve an innovation that facilitates the insurance of risk, without
considering whether that innovation could create interconnections in the
financial system that speed up the transmission of shocks and thus endanger
financial stability.
Post-Crisis, there is a general recognition that financial stability is a
vitally important goal of financial regulation55 – this Essay therefore asserts
that any pre-approval regime for financial products should focus squarely on
systemic risks that might imperil such financial stability. Omarova’s
proposal is much more squarely aligned with a focus on financial stability.
It argues for the creation of a Financial Product Approval Commission
(“FPAC”),56 which should use a tripartite test when evaluating a new
48

Turner, supra Note 42 at 22.
Posner & Weyl, supra Note 5 at 1348. See also Daniel Carpenter and Patricia McCoy,
Keeping Tabs on Financial Innovation: Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial
Regulation, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 195, 206-208 (2013).
50
“For clinical trials to be effective, they would have to be conducted over the entire
business cycle, resulting in protracted delays.” Carpenter & McCoy, supra Note 49 at 197.
51
Posner & Weyl, supra Note 5; Omarova, supra Note 6.
52
Posner & Weyl, supra Note 5 at 1309.
53
Id. at 1308. In their article “insuring” is used as a synonym for hedging, and “gambling”
is used as a synonym for speculative activity. Id.
54
Id. at 1312.
55
Hilary J. Allen, What is “Financial Stability?”: The Need for Some Common Language
in International Financial Regulation, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 929, 930 (2014).
56
Omarova, supra Note 6 at 129.
49
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financial product. The FPAC should consider: (i) the economic purpose of
the product; (ii) the institutional capacity of the counterparties dealing in the
product; and (iii) the likely systemic effects of the product.57 “The applicant
entity would bear the burden of showing that the proposed product meets all
of the statutory and regulatory criteria for approval.”58
Omarova’s first “economic purpose” test bears some similarities to
Posner & Weyl’s social utility standard, in that it raises doubts about
approving products that are designed to be used primarily for speculation.59
However, Omarova’s first test is broader that Posner & Weyl’s, in that it
also considers more globally whether the product satisfies a genuine market
need (or if it is just driven by profit motivations on the supply side, or
designed purely to arbitrage existing regulations).60 Omarova’s second test
is one of institutional capacity: “[d]o we want this particular institution to
trade and deal in this particular product?”,61 based on that institution’s
“ability to incur leverage, its business and risk profile, its internal
compliance and management structures, and any history of enforcement
actions.”62 In making an initial determination about whether a new product
should be permitted to enter the financial system, the regulator could
dispense with this institutional capacity test (although questions of
institutional capacity would certainly be relevant to the ongoing monitoring
of approved products once they have entered the financial system).63
Products that do not meet both Omarova’s economic purpose test, and her
systemic effects test discussed below, would be banned for all financial
institutions.
From this Essay’s perspective, the most important, and challenging,
of Omarova’s tests is the third “systemic effects” test. This provides that
products should not be approved if they pose “potentially unacceptable
systemic risk or [are] otherwise likely to increase the vulnerability of the
financial system.”64 In prior work, I have developed a conceptual
framework for regulators to use when evaluating the systemic risks posed by
a new financial product.65 The starting point is that because financial
innovation increases complexity, new products are presumptively
57

Id. at 67.
Id. at 131.
59
Id. at 116.
60
Id. at 116-117.
61
Id. at 121.
62
Allen, supra Note 17 at 211.
63
“[E]ven if the proposed financial product may have proven economic and social utility, as
a general matter, it may not be appropriate for a particular financial institution that fails to
prove its ability to understand, identify, measure, monitor, and manage potential risks the
product poses to the institution‘s own financial health, as well as to the financial well-being
of the product‘s users and overall market stability.” Omarova, supra Note 6 at 121.
64
Id. at 122.
65
Allen, supra Note 17 at 212-222.
58
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problematic for financial stability.66 Financial institutions can then seek to
rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the capital intermediation
and/or risk management benefits of the proposed innovation justify the
threat to financial stability posed by the new product.67 In doing so, the
financial institution must demonstrate that the proposed innovation will
generate growth for the broader economy, and not just for the financial
sector.68 When evaluating new financial products, regulators should
consider, amongst other things: “(i) the extent to which the innovation
increases complexity, (ii) the extent to which the innovation multiplies the
amount of risk in the system, (iii) the extent to which the innovation
obscures the allocation of risk and capital in the financial system, and (iv)
the extent to which the innovation channels capital to what are, on balance,
non-productive investments (especially in real estate).”69 Regulators should
also consider whether the threats to stability posed by the innovation can be
addressed using more traditional regulatory tools (like disclosure and capital
regulation) – but regulators should always remain mindful that “concerns
about increases in complexity can only really be dealt with by controlling
the introduction of new innovations into the financial system.”70
It is worth noting that, in addition to keeping problematic products
out of the marketplace, a precautionary pre-approval regime for complex
financial products can beneficially impact both regulators and the industry
in a variety of ancillary ways. At present, regulators are hard-pressed to
keep up with what the industry is doing. A pre-approval process would
adjust this dynamic by requiring the industry to come to the regulators with
information before introducing a new product line. This would force the
industry to internalize some of the costs of testing their new products (for
example, through stress tests) and providing their findings to the
regulators.71 The burden shifting inherent in a pre-approval regime would
therefore help alleviate the fiscal and informational constraints currently
faced by regulators. Furthermore, the shifted burden would create more of
an adversarial process between regulators and industry, potentially
mitigating tendencies towards groupthink and capture, and galvanizing
regulators’ identity as protectors of long-term financial stability.72 In terms
of impacting industry behavior, a pre-approval process may cause financial
institutions to abandon of their own accord innovations that are unlikely to
pass regulatory muster, or that would only be profitable if they could be
rushed to market quickly.73 The mere existence of a pre-approval regime

66

Id. at 214.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 221.
70
Id. at 222.
71
Id. at 222-223.
72
Id. at 200-202.
73
Id. at 224.
67

12

Hilary J. Allen

may therefore be salutary if it causes financial institutions to abandon
innovations that have little to recommend them other than their “newness”.
V. BARRIERS TO PRE-APPROVAL REGIMES
This Essay has canvassed numerous benefits associated with
implementing a pre-approval regime for complex financial products.
However, two types of barriers to such a regime immediately come to mind.
The first is political: varying attitudes to precaution will likely impact how
amenable policymakers are to such proposals. The other type of barrier is
technical – in order to determine whether a product is “new” and thus
requires approval, we need to understand the defining features of existing
financial products and categorize them in a way that makes it clear where
one product stops and another one begins. This is daunting – however, there
are currently several technical projects afoot that may improve the
feasibility of a precautionary pre-approval process. This Section will
consider these political and technological barriers in more detail.
A. Political Barriers
Many jurisdictions have implemented consumer and investor
protection schemes, which seek to ensure that unsophisticated parties
acquiring financial products are not unfairly taken advantage of.74
However, the pre-approval regime for complex financial products discussed
in this Essay is not primarily concerned with the suitability of products for
those who acquire them – instead, it is focused on preventing externalities
from impacting those who have no connection at all with the products. As
discussed in Section II, this type of approach is inherently precautionary –
the ultimate aim is to prevent the broader harms that may flow to society if
the tail risks inherent in complex financial products come to fruition. The
political feasibility of such a regime is therefore likely to depend in part on
national (or supranational) attitudes to precaution.
Given that most complex financial instruments are (at least
currently) the product of innovation by financial institutions headquartered

74

In the United States, the Securities Exchange Commission is mandated to protect
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under the Federal consumer financial laws.” Dodd-Frank § 1011(a). In Europe, the
preamble to Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
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instruments. . . in order to increase transparency, better protect investors, reinforce
confidence, address unregulated areas, and ensure that supervisors are granted adequate
powers to fulfill their tasks.”

Precautionary Review of Financial Products

13

in either the United States or the European Union,75 this Essay will focus on
how receptive these two jurisdictions are to precautionary regulation.
Fortunately, there is a wealth of literature that compares the attitudes of the
United States and Europe to precaution.76 While this literature rarely
considers financial regulation in particular, the insights that it gives
regarding attitudes to precautionary approaches to environmental risks can
inform our discussion. Although it can be dangerous to assume that
precautionary attitudes are consistent across different subject matters (for
example, in recent years, the United States has demonstrated itself to be
very amenable to a precautionary approach to anti-terrorism and national
defense measures),77 it is uncontroversial to say that – at least at present –
the United States is much more skeptical of precaution in the realm of
environmental regulation than Europe is.78
As I have previously argued, there are many parallels to be drawn
between environmental regulation and financial stability regulation,79 and
this Essay builds on these previous arguments to assert that attitudes towards
financial precaution are likely to mirror those towards environmental
precaution. Both financial and environmental regulators are dealing with
highly complex systems where there is great uncertainty about the
interactions of the elements within those systems.80 As a result, such
regulators have difficulty demonstrating that their regulation will succeed
(or has already succeeded – how can you prove that a crisis didn’t occur
because of your precautionary efforts?) – but regulators must nonetheless
exert their best efforts because systemic failure is catastrophic.81 The
political dynamics of environmental regulation also parallel those
confronted by financial stability regulation. In both instances, society has a
large but diffuse interest in socially beneficial outcomes, while the regulated
industry has a concentrated pecuniary interest in avoiding regulation,
generating collective action problems.82
It should not be surprising, then, that just as the EU “has become
more risk-averse toward a broad range of health, safety, and environmental
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risks”,83 it seems to be more hospitable to ideas about preventing financial
systemic risk through precautionary pre-approval regimes for financial
instruments. For example, in its European Parliament platform, the German
Social Democratic Party pledged to seek to put a product pre-approval
process on the European agenda by linking it to the planned capital markets
union.84 Conversely, the United States has increasingly focused on
“scientific proof of risk and on formal risk assessment”85 before regulating
environmental risks, and there is also a movement afoot to make
precautionary financial regulation more difficult. While financial regulatory
agencies have typically been given more leeway than environmental
regulatory agencies in the United States86 (in the sense that the latter, but not
the former, are required to conduct to quantified cost-benefit analysis of
their regulations),87 there are moves to extend this quantified cost-benefit
analysis standard to financial regulation. There have been repeated attempts
to enact laws implementing such a requirement,88 and though these attempts
have not been successful to date, the D.C. Circuit has nonetheless handed
down a string of decisions that strike down financial rulemakings because of
the inadequacy of the economic analysis provided by the implementing
agency.89
The prospects for the implementation of a precautionary preapproval process for complex financial products thus seem more sanguine in
Europe than in the United States. However, the unilateral creation of a preapproval process in Europe would (most probably) simply result in a
83

David Vogel, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2012) at
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migration of complex financial products to the United States.90
Coordination between the European Union and the United States thus seems
a prerequisite to any effective pre-approval process,91 and financial
regulatory coordination is certainly being discussed as part of the
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”)92 between the United States and the European Union.93 However, it is
not yet clear if a concluded T-TIP would result in weaker or stronger
financial stability regulation.94 It may be that the T-TIP, rather than
exporting European attitude towards precautionary regulation into US law,
ends up ensuring that neither jurisdiction implements a precautionary preapproval regime for complex financial products.
B. Technical Barriers
More concrete, but potentially more scalable, are the technical
barriers to implementing a pre-approval regime for new financial products.
The threshold questions for any such regime are “what is a financial
product?” and “when does a financial product stop being one type of
product and become a new one?”. While easy to pose, the answers to these
questions are complicated, and unless they can be answered, then a preapproval process will fail – no matter how conceptually sound the
underlying logic of such a regime. Even less aggressive forms of financial
90

For a discussion of concerns about stringent national regulation causing financial services
businesses to change jurisdictions, see David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global
Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 683, 689 (2012).
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Partnership: A Detailed View (available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-TTIP-a-DetailedView)
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TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) Cooperation on
financial services regulation, 1 (Jan. 27, 2014) (available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152101.pdf).
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stability regulation – such as the monitoring of systemic risks mandated by
Dodd-Frank95 – will have limited efficacy without a clear understanding of
the financial products available in the market.96 This Part therefore explores
potential avenues for creating a taxonomy of financial products that could
facilitate a pre-approval regime for new and complex products, or at the
very least improve systemic risk monitoring by providing clarity regarding
the financial products that institutions are dealing in.
In the United States, there is no useful legal definition of “financial
product”. There are various pieces of legislation (such as the definition of
“security” in the Securities Act of 1933)97 that give laundry lists of certain
types of financial products, but there is no universal definition that
encompasses all financial products. A more comprehensive list of
“financial instruments” can be found in the EU’s MiFID,98 but that directive
lists only the financial products available at the time the directive was
finalized. In other jurisdictions, a more functional approach has been taken
– for example, Section 763A(1) of the Australian Corporations Act defines a
financial product as “a facility through which, or through the acquisition of
which, a person does one or more of the following: (a) makes a financial
investment . . . (b) manages financial risk . . . (c) makes non‑cash
payments.” A broad functional definition like this can encompass an everevolving universe of financial products, and as such, is superior to a list-like
definition that was fixed at the time the relevant legislation was passed.99
However, a broad functional legal definition would give no guidance as to
when something stops being one type of financial product and becomes
another, nor does it give any assistance in determining if a financial product
is “new”. Such distinctions are particularly vital if a pre-approval process is
to regulate the introduction of new products into the financial system.
Therefore, while legislated definitions of “financial products” should be
broad and functional, regulators should maintain and update a much more
detailed list of all the financial product types.100
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In the United States, the Office of Financial Research (“OFR”) plans
to create “a reference database for all financial instruments”.101 This
database has yet to take shape, but the first step that must be taken is to
decide how granular it should be in categorizing financial products. Any
financial product is essentially a contract that sets out the rights and
obligations of the parties thereto. It is possible then, to view each contract
as an individualized transaction that is separate and distinct from every other
transaction (even if the contract shares a large number of similarities with
other contracts). There are certainly benefits to looking at financial products
at a transactional-level of specificity – doing so would give regulators an
unparalleled view of what is happening in the financial system, and the data
generated thereby would be enormously helpful in monitoring the build up
of systemic risks in the system. However, there are also benefits to
categorizing products at a higher level of generality. A widely-used
taxonomy of financial products would allow for comparison of products
across firms: “[l]inking permanent identifiers to financial instrument
characteristics will facilitate bottom-up analysis of portfolios and permit
complex stress test simulations.”102
It would also “facilitate[]
communication among users of the information, so that each party is
confident that both parties are talking about the same thing.”103 This Essay
therefore argues for the development of a taxonomy that recognizes the key
features of all existing financial products, which taxonomy can be updated
to encompass new financial products as they are developed.
Henry Hu’s early work on the categorization of derivatives may be
of some assistance in developing such a taxonomy. He suggests (while
acknowledging the potential cost of) “establishing an initial catalogue of
known OTC derivatives, broken down by genus, family and species. The
catalogue would need to be updated regularly, again with the cooperation of
the industry.”104 Partnerships with biologists and others specializing in
complex adaptive systems could be enormously helpful in establishing a
catalogue that extends beyond OTC derivatives to encompass all financial
products. As a science, biology embraces a huge amount of ever-evolving
complexity, and manages to accommodate this within non-static taxonomies
that categorize all the various types of life. Although debates continue to
rage in the biological community about the appropriate way to order a
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taxonomy of living organisms,105 something akin to the Linnaean biological
taxonomy will likely suffice for the (comparatively) much less complex
financial system. Using a hierarchy of kingdom, phylum, class, order,
family, genus and finally species, the Linnaean biological taxonomy
elucidates both similarities and important differences between living
organisms.106 A similar exercise could be carried out for financial products.
Of course, this begs the question of which characteristics of a
financial product are considered sufficiently defining and important that
they should be used to distinguish one financial product from another. The
UK’s Financial Services Authority surveyed financial institutions and noted
that those institutions’ “criteria for classifying a structured product as ‘new’
differed amongst firms, but generally related to any significant variation to
the product, such as changes in: counterparties, pay-off profiles, product
shape, underlying index, and distribution channels.”107 These are axes to
consider when developing the taxonomy. In an interview, Omarova
mentioned some other axes to consider, including “terms related to
payments and other material rights and obligations of the parties to the
transaction, the nature of reference assets, the intended and actual uses of
the product, the nature and systemic footprint of the counterparties and
target markets, etc.”108
Agreement on the defining axes of financial products is vital,
otherwise any use of the taxonomy will be plagued by arbitrage. Because
most financial instruments can be characterized alternatively as either a new
type of financial instrument or as the sum of existing financial instrument
parts, unless the axes are clear, it will be difficult to demarcate the point at
which a new use of an existing instrument becomes a sui generis new
instrument. For example, if we were to imagine for a moment that credit
default swaps (“CDS”) did not yet exist, a financial institution seeking to
introduce CDS into the marketplace might simply say that the CDS is just a
new application (i.e. to credit instruments) of a non-exchange traded
bilateral forward contract.109 But a properly structured taxonomy would
pick up the difference in reference asset (i.e. the underlying credit
105
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instrument), and use that difference to distinguish CDSs from existing
forward contracts.
As a thought experiment, we can consider how a securitized product
known as a “synthetic CDO squared” might be classified using a biological
hierarchical taxonomy adapted for financial products.
By way of
background, “CDO” is an acronym for “collateralized debt obligation”.
CDOs are a type of asset-backed securitization, meaning that an investor in
the CDO will receive a bond or note that is issued by a special purpose
vehicle (“SPV”)110 that owns a number of debt obligations, and the principal
and interest obligations on such bond/note are serviced only by the revenues
generated by the debt obligations owned by the SPV.111 In this way, the
revenue streams from the debt obligations are turned into securities that can
be bought and sold in the capital markets (hence the term securitization). In
the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, the debt obligations typically securitized
using CDOs were themselves securitized cash flows from mortgages known
as “mortgage-backed securities” or “MBSs”.112 CDOs were thus more
complex than MBSs, and synthetic CDO squareds (as explained more fully
below) were more complex still.
The kingdom for a synthetic CDO squared might be “financial
product”, the phylum a “security”. The class could be “bond” or “note”
(depending on how the sponsor of the deal chooses to structure the
securitization), and the order could be “asset-backed”. (Asset-backed bonds
and notes would be distinguishable from other types of bonds and notes
based on their structure, which involves using an SPV to ensure that the
assets that back the bond/note are remote from bankruptcy, and that the
proceeds of those assets are the only source of repayment to the holders for
principal and interest on the bonds/notes).113 The family could reflect the
type of assets being securitized – a CDO involves the securitization of debt
instruments. Different CDOs could be broken down into genus – including
CDOs that have been squared, or even cubed (a CDO squared involves the
securitization of other CDOs, a CDO cubed involves the securitization of
other CDO squareds).114 Finally, the species could reflect whether the
transaction is synthetic or not. The non-synthetic versions would be backed
by actual debt instruments or CDOs (as the case may be), while the
synthetic versions would be backed by credit default swaps that have debt
110
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instruments or CDOs (as the case may be) as reference obligations.115 There
is then room for further differentiation at the subspecies level, if desired,
based on the terms of the contracts being used. This type of exercise could
be carried out for all existing financial products – while this would be a cost
and time intensive exercise at the outset, once the taxonomy were
established and the sunk costs expended, updating it as new products
evolved would be much less costly.
A taxonomy like this would be a prerequisite for a pre-approval
process for financial products. Once the standardized features of individual
products have been identified and catalogued at an appropriate level of
generality, regulators could identify products that should be banned for all
financial institutions to issue or underwrite. (Our synthetic CDO squareds
might be a good candidate for such a ban, given that they seem to make little
improvement to capital intermediation, yet contribute significantly to the
complexity of the financial system).116 After that initial review, if any
market participant wanted to issue or underwrite a financial product that did
not fit within the parameters of a product already set out in the taxonomy
and approved for use, that market participant would need to approach the
regulator to seek authorization to do so. Omarova has suggested that “[t]he
consequences to a financial institution of failing to apply for a separate
approval of a financial product, which is being used for a different purpose
or by a different class of clients than originally disclosed to the regulators,
would be severe: any transactions in such new, unapproved instruments are
illegal.”117
There has already been some work done that can serve as a useful
starting point for creating a taxonomy of financial products. The Enterprise
Data Management Council is developing a Financial Industry Business
Ontology or “FIBO™” that:
is a business conceptual ontology standard providing a description
of the structure and contractual obligations of financial instruments,
legal entities, market data and financial processes.
The primary application of the business conceptual ontology is for
data harmonization and for the unambiguous sharing of meaning
across data repositories. This common language (or Rosetta stone)
115
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most trivial even if they had not played a role in creating financial instability.” Financial
Services Authority, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, 41 (Mar. 2009)
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for the financial industry supports business process automation and
facilitates risk analysis.
...
It is being created as a collaborative effort among industry
practitioners, semantic technology experts and information
architects to standardize the language used to precisely define the
terms, conditions, and characteristics of financial instruments; the
legal and relationship structure of business entities; the content and
time dimensions of market data; and the legal obligations associated
with issuance, corporate actions, transactions and other financial
processes.118
While the FIBO™ project does not seem to group the instruments into any
kind of hierarchical taxonomy (in the sense that it defines instruments
individually, rather than as subsets of broader categories of products), its
preliminary definitional work elucidating the key terms, conditions and
characteristics of financial instruments would provide a significant head
start for the creators of the type of taxonomy suggested by this Essay.
There are also pending technological innovations that might
facilitate the creation of such taxonomy. Mark Flood and Oliver
Goodenough of the Office of Financial Research recently published a paper
exploring the potential for financial contracts to be represented as computer
code that is machine-readable.119 “Code is a chain of logic, in which one
action is logically defined along a specific path, to lead to another action”:120
Flood and Goodenough have recognized that contracts are also chains of
logic, that can be translated into code if we can identify the finite set of
states of the relationship between the parties, and encode “explicit transition
rules for shifting the relationship from one state to another, based on the
realization of certain predefined events.”121 Flood and Goodenough have
already restated a simplified financial contract in formal computational
terms – the next step is to attempt to encode much more complex contracts
in this way.
If technology advances quickly in this area, a starting point for the
catalogue proposed in this Essay would be to collect standard form contracts
118
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for complex financial products, and allow these to be sorted by a computer
algorithm along the axes of identified key terms. While some of the form
contracts used by financial institutions will not be publicly available,
regulators often have the power to compel disclosure for financial stability
purposes.122 Furthermore, many contracts for complex financial products
are already somewhat standardized across the industry – the ISDA Master
Agreement and its various annexes and confirmations (which are used for
the overwhelming majority of swap contracts) being a prime example.123
Regulators could use these form contracts to assist in classifying the various
types of swaps. In addition to collecting contracts, regulators should also be
able to compel other types of information from financial institutions (for
example, information about the intended users for the product) to enable
them to construct the taxonomy, and this information could be supplemented
with information garnered from databases maintained by exchanges,
clearinghouses and other areas of the government124 (for example, the IRS is
regularly required to distinguish between different financial products for
taxation purposes125 – its resources could therefore be helpful in
constructing the taxonomy).
Finally, it is important to note the international dimensions of such a
project. The financial system is global, the counterparties to complex
financial instruments are often located in different jurisdictions, the
operations of many large financial institutions straddle multiple countries,
and it is very difficult to get a clear picture of which foreign subsidiaries are
running what business.126 Furthermore, regulators around the world
cooperate in their monitoring of systemic risks and their regulation of
financial stability.127 As such, the catalogue proposed in this Essay would
ideally be developed as an international project. The most obvious
candidate to coordinate this project is the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”)
– unlike other international financial standard-setters like the Bank for
122

For example, pursuant to Dodd-Frank § 112(d)(3), the Financial Stability Oversight
Council, acting through the Office of Financial Research, may require reports from
financial institutions (directly or through their primary regulators) for the purpose of
assessing threats to financial stability.
123
Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private Regulation
of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA and the Future of Financial Reform, 54
VA. J. INT’L L. 9, 13-14 (2013).
124
Nakamura, supra Note 100 at 14.
125
“Financial innovation poses a deep challenge for tax policy. The current United States
tax system is based on a system of “tax cubbyholes,” a few idealized transactions for which
the system specifies an exact tax treatment. Since any given new financial product is
unlikely to fit squarely into a particular cubbyhole, the appropriate tax treatment for such
products is often unclear.” Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual
Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 570 (1994).
126
See, for example, the discussion of Bank of America’s cross-border operations in
Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: BofA in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV.
485, 491-492 (2013).
127
Hilary J. Allen, What is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language
in International Financial Regulation, 45 Geo. J. Int’l L 929, 940 (2014).

Precautionary Review of Financial Products

23

International Settlements (“BIS”), the International Organization of
Securities Commissioners (“IOSCO”) and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”), the FSB’s focus is not restricted to one
sector of the financial system. Instead, the FSB aims to promote the
stability of the financial system as a whole128 – and the creation of an
internationally accepted taxonomy of financial products would certainly
advance that goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
“As you do not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with
complexity”:129 addressing complex financial products with even more
complicated disclosure regimes is, in the end, a losing strategy for financial
stability. Instead, regulation should seek to promote simplicity by limiting
the number of complex financial products entering the system. This Essay
has canvassed the proposals that have been advanced for pre-approval
regimes for new financial products, and provided a realistic discussion of
the political and technical barriers thereto. The political barriers may prove
insurmountable (at least until there is a future crisis that prompts more
precautionary regulation), but technological improvements in managing
large amounts of data and automating financial contracts may allow us to
conquer the technical barriers. At the very least, the catalogue of financial
products proposed in this Essay is a goal worth pursuing, as it would ensure
a greater level of consistency in the nomenclature used by different firms
and regulators, and thus improve the efficacy of monitoring for financial
stability.
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